Text COM:1915422 (464 lines) [W1]
From:
Internet: Vraja Lila <vraja1@hotmail.com>
Date:
08-Dec-98 06:21
Cc:
Apocalypse 1999? (Are you ready?) [265]
(sender: Kaunteya (das) JPS
(Mayapur
- IN))
Subject:
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Fears mount over millennium bombs
Will
the Year 2000
problem make a
dangerous
situation
explosive?
The multiple warheads from
a US
missile light up the sky
during a live exercise over
the
vast atoll of Kwajalein.
The
atoll is used by the US
military as a test site.
By Kari
Huus
MSNBC
Dec
6 — Perhaps no entity on earth faces a
more
mammoth Year 2000 challenge than the U.S.
Department of Defense, which has some 1.5
million computers, 28,000 systems and 10,000
networks. Within its purview, no area has
prompted more concern than the country’s nuclear
weapons arsenal, and whether its control and
command is safe from the millennial bug.
Full coverage: The millennium bug
Global nuclear
club
U.S. and
Russia are
the focus of
most
concern in the
Y2K
battle
Country
Warheads
United States
7250
C.I.S.
6240
France
449
United Kingdom
260
China
225
India
NA
Pakistan
NA
Israel
NA
SOURCE:
Natural Resources
Defense
Council
THE CONCERN
LIES with computer systems
programmed to use two rather than four digits
to describe the
year — for example “79” instead of “1979.” When
the year
2000 arrives, experts predict that some
computers may
mistake the date for 1900 and shut down or
malfunction.
They may also feed bad information to other
systems with
which they are linked.
The Pentagon
stands by its Year 2000 (or
Y2K) effort,
which it says has been under way
since 1995 and
budgeted at
$2.5 billion over five years. But defense
officials don’t offer
guarantees. “None of us knows exactly what is
going to
happen,” says Pentagon
spokesperson Susan
Hansen. “We
feel cautiously optimistic that what will
happen is some
nuisances rather than crises… We feel pretty
confident that
we will be able to provide for the
national
security of the
United States.”
Cautious
optimism on the part of the DoD
has done little
to reassure critics. A recently released report
by the British
American Security Information Council (BASIC)
in
Washington says Department of Defense efforts
to address
the Y2K issue have been riddled by “severe and
recurring
problems.” And, BASIC notes, there is even less
information
available about Moscow’s efforts, much less the
rest of the
world’s nuclear weapons infrastructure.
The combination
of possible computer
glitches and the
hair-trigger posture of U.S. and Russian
nuclear forces raise
the specter of a missile launch based on
compromised
surveillance data, or a communication breakdown
in the event
of a real attack, according to the BASIC
report. “U.S.
decision-makers must take steps now to preclude
disaster
should the Pentagon fail,” says the report’s
author, Michael
Kraig, a Scoville fellow.
RISKS AND MYTHS
Analysts on
both sides of the debate are
quick to say
that missiles are highly unlikely to launch
themselves at the
stroke of midnight on Jan.1, 2000.
Rather, most
concerns about military
computer glitches
are focused on the vast web of computerized
communications systems under STRATCOM — U.S.
Strategic Command, which controls the country’s
nuclear
arsenal. Equally worrisome is U.S.
Space
Command (part of
NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense
Command), responsible for early-warning radar
and
surveillance — the basis for military
decisions. (For a review,
see the Federation of American Scientists’
Nuclear Forces
Guide).
As in other
sectors, no one is sure how
the military’s
overall procedures will work if one part of the
system fails.
What raises the stakes is that both the United
States and
Russia maintain “launch on warning” postures —
calling for
nuclear retaliation upon detection of the
other’s launch of
missiles.
If date-related
problems produce
inaccurate
early-warning data, or if communications within
the military
command are compromised, there will be 10
minutes to half
an hour to clarify the situation and make the
decision to
launch or hold back.
Even in normal
times misinterpretation
of data frequently
leads to heightened alert. Signals are
sometimes garbled by
solar disturbances. In 1979, personnel at NORAD
saw the
numbers indicating ballistic missile launches
suddenly jump
from zero to 20. In preparation to retaliate,
nuclear bomber
crews started their engines, and Minutemen
missiles were
readied. Ultimately, the data was traced to a
faulty embedded
chip design.
Who's benefitting from the frenzy?
Given all the
work required to make U.S.
weapons
systems Y2K safe, who’s getting the contracts
— and
subsequently earning big fees? Well, it’s not
a windfall
for defense giants who traditionally make
most of their
money from government contracts. In fact, the
amount
budgeted — $2.54 billion spread over five
years —is
hardly a blip on the screen for companies
like defense
and aerospace behemoth Lockheed Martin Corp.
Lockheed says it
has had piecemeal
contracts on the
overall Y2K effort, but that most of its
input came under
regular government maintenance contracts.
Compare the
amount the company is earning on Y2K upgrades
to the
$80 million the company is spending to make
itself
internally compliant, and
there’s little or
no benefit. “It’s a
wash, or less than a wash, ” says Jim Fetig,
a
spokesman for Lockheed. “The outgo is bigger
than the
input. “ The same message came
from Northrop
Grumman, which makes military surveillance
systems,
military electronics and combat aircraft.
Despite winning
a handful of small information
technology
contracts,
“we’ve noticed no big upsurge, ” a spokesman
said.
— Kari Huus
In 1995, Moscow
went into a state of
high alert when its
early warning radar mistook a
Norwegian
scientific probe for
a U.S. trident missile launched from the
Baltic. The response
decision was elevated all the way to President
Boris Yeltsin,
his defense minister and the chief of staff,
who decided
against action when they determined the
“impact” would be
outside Russian borders.
There is also a
danger that, in the
event of data correctly
interpreting attack, communication systems used
to
coordinate a reaction may malfunction. Indeed,
the DoD’s
efforts to prevent this breakdown go only so
far, since the
military has shifted from largely dedicated
communications
systems to commercial networks. In testimony
before a
House subcommittee in June, Deputy Secretary of
Defense
John Hamre conceded, “If Ma Bell’s or Bell
Atlantic’s
system fails on Year 2000, we’re going to have
mission
failure, and I don’t have any control over
that.”
FAULTY CHAIN
Few military
analysts suggest that 2000
will bring the
Armageddon. “The most likely thing is that Y2K
problems
get lost in the noise of flaky
computer
problems,” says John
Pike, security analyst for the Federation of
American
Scientists, a privately funded, non-profit
organization in
Washington, D.C.
However, Pike
believes the greatest risk
lies with events
that follow component failure. “The thing you
worry about is
people improvising,” he says, causing a
relatively innocuous
event to escalate, as happened in the Three
Mile Island and
Chernobyl crises.
Pike paints a
scenario: “Most probably,
the response is
not that a missile will jump out of its silo at
midnight, but that
the door of the missile silo will get stuck.” A
technician
whose job it is to keep the missile ready for
use drops his
wrench into the silo, tearing a hole in the
fuel tank, causing an
explosion. The explosion severs communication
with the
base, and it goes into a higher state of alert,
which raises
concern at military bases in Russia.
“If systems
behave peculiarly, people
will be nervous,
overworked, and stop trusting the system,” says
Pike.
“Consequently the man-machine interface starts
behaving in
unpredictable ways.”
HOW MUCH PROGRESS IS ENOUGH?
The Department
of Defense says the
situation is well
under control. It reports that it has
identified 2,581
mission-critical systems, of which 53 percent
are now fully
Y2K ready. Another 1,014 are going through the
paces, and
a few hundred are to be retired or replaced
before 2000. The
idea is to finish all the fixes by Jan. 1, 1999
— three months
earlier than previously announced, according to
spokesperson
Hansen. This will leave ample time for testing,
and including
Y2K testing in military exercises.
But BASIC,
which did extensive
documentation of the
DoD process, contends that there are serious
flaws in the
Pentagon’s representation — including ad-hoc
funding, lax
management and inadequate standards for
declaring a system
“Y2K compliant.” In short, the fixes won’t be
finished and
tested in time, says BASIC. “Initial research
findings… have
resulted in no confidence that the Pentagon’s
present
program will meet the Year 2000 challenge,”
according to its
report.
Those findings
were based in part on the
government’s
own conclusions, which started to set off
alarms last spring.
The Office of Management and Budget has
expressed its
concerns that DoD will not meet its goals. The
General
Accounting Office for the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs warned in a report in
April, “Time is
running out to correct Department of Defense
systems that
could malfunction… the impact of these failures
could be
widespread, costly and potentially disruptive
to military
operations worldwide.”
An array of
audit reports posted by the
Inspector
General for the DoD suggest
many military
departments are
lagging behind schedule on Y2K efforts, and
predict
disruptions in command and control, testing and
day to day
operations.
THE NUCLEAR CLUB
Assuming that
the Pentagon meets its
goals, however, it
seems clear that Russia will not, particularly
in light of its
severe economic
constraints. Moscow has
insisted that the
Russian system is different — not susceptible
to Y2K
glitches — but the argument has failed to
convince. Defense
Deputy Secretary Hamre
described Russia’s early
warning
system as “fragile” in Senate testimony. “Our
concern is that
Russia and China have only a very rudimentary
understanding of the Year 2000
problem, which
is why we
need to reach out to them to make sure they
have custodial
confidence in their own systems,” he said.
That was in
June. As of October,
Washington and
Moscow were discussing the possibility of
exchanging
personnel in military sites to usher in the
millennium, which
spokesperson Hansen says will “… relay
information and
relieve the anxiety in case of a glitch ... to
ensure no one
misconstrues Y2K problem for an attack.”
Some critics of
U.S. nuclear policy,
however, say that
the fundamental flaw is in the posture of U.S.
and Russian
forces in the post-Cold War era. BASIC, as well
as members
of Congress and other non-governmental groups,
urge the
U.S. and Russia to “stand down or de-alert”
missiles that
remain on a hair-trigger prior to 2000. Though
most agree it is
too late to separate missiles from warheads,
BASIC’s Kraig
urges the two sides to otherwise disable
missiles.
Others are
calling for an independent
audit by a
non-governmental agency and fuller public
disclosure of the
results. “We don’t know squat about testing at
STRATCOM,” says Pike of FAS. “We know a lot
more
about Y2K compliance of parking garages at
Washington
headquarters than
computers that are planning
thermonuclear
war.”
The Defense
Department says it’s just
not a practical
solution to bring in outsiders unfamiliar with
the multitude of
rules and regulations to which they are
subject. And as with
many of the ideas being bandied about at the
cusp of 1999,
there’s just not enough time. Says Hansen: “By
the time
[outside auditors] got up to speed it would
probably be past
the year 2000.”
Federation of American Scientists
STRATCOM home page
U.S. Department of Defense home page
U.S. Army Y2K page
______________________________________________________
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(Text COM:1915422) -----------------------------------------