MAYAVADI PHILOSOPHY:

Analysis and Refutation

I. Introduction: This outline will deal with 3 topics -

A. What is Mayavada philosophy?

B. How to defeat it with their own arguments.

C. How to defeat it with Bhagavata arguments.

II. Mayavada philosophy is very old.

A. Even the 4 Kumaras were impersonalists.

B. Any person in Maya is naturally a Mayavadi.

1. If you want to defeat someone you should know his philosopy.

2. We should know Mayavadi philosophy:

a. for preaching;

b. for our own benefit as well, because we also are conta-

minated by it;

c. jnanam-karmani-anavrtam:

i. Jnana is of 3 kinds: knowledge of self, God and oneness

ii.The knowledge of oneness is being rejected. Knowle-

dge of self and God explains everything nicely, inclu-

ding the oneness too. No need of such a separate depart

ment of knowledge.

III. Structure of Mayavada philosophy:

A. It is also called Vivartavada (lit. "superimpositionism").

1. arthadhyasa - superimposition of one object on another.

2. jnanadhyasa - imposition of illusion upon oneself.

3. For this superimposition to happen, there must be:

a. Senses,

b. An abnormal situation (e.g. darkness),

c. Experience,

d. An example of above three components: seeing a rope as a

snake in the darkness.

B. Philosophical proofs, and which philosophers accept them:

1. Direct perception (accepted by Charvakas).

2. Inference (anumana) + 1 is accepted by Buddhists.

a. Hypothesis = there is fire on the mountain.

b. Cause (hetu) = because there is smoke there. c. Example = Where there is smoke, there is fire.

d. Review of cause = The mountain has smoke...

e. Conclusion = ...therefore the mountain has fire.

3. Sabdha (spiritual sound) + 1&2 is accepted by Vaishnavas.

4. Arthavati (similarity) + 1-3 is accepted by logicians.

a. "Have you seen a blue cow?"

b. "No, but I would know one if I did" (cow + blue).

5. Arthapatti: "This fat man does not eat in the day, he must eat at

night." (Logicians)

6. Abhava (nonexistance) + 1-5 is accepted by Mayavadis.

a. Nonexistance means: "There is no cow here."

b. It is a kind of knowledge based on the absence of

knowledge or perception of something.

C. Four categories within Mayavada Philosophy:

1. Sat = existance (Brahman).

2. Asat = nonexistance (horns on rabbit).

3. Sat-asat = something that exists for a time, then ceases to exist.

4. Anirvachaniya (also mithya)= neither 1,2 or 3, i.e. Maya

(which makes one think a rope is a snake. Inexplicable, illusory).

D. Levels of perception according to Shankaracharya:

1. Paramarthika - transcendental (Brahman).

2. Vyavaharika - "practical".

3. Pratibhasika - apparent, but illusiory (like dreaming).

a. One must go from this stage to next higher.

b. When coming to second stage, individuality remains.

c. But at highest stage, individuality is erased.

E. Maya:

1. Maya is inexplicable; example - a dumb person cannot

describe the taste of rasgulla, but still there is taste. Brahman is

covered by Maya, but don't ask why.

2. Two stages of Maya:

a. Covering with illusion; that's simply Maya.

b. Distorting with ignorance (avidya).

3. When Maya covers Brahman with illusion, Iswara‑consciousness

appears. He is conditioned to be the Lord.

4. When Brahman is further distorted by avidya, jiva consciousness

appears. Avidya makes the subtle body.

5. There is no transformation in this process, only imposition

(of a false conception)

6. When illusion and ignorance are dispelled, no state of any

describable existance remains.

7. Mayavadi story: Vyasadeva sent Sukadeva to learn from Janaka.

Janaka said to Sukadeva, "Give me my dakshine before I teach

you anything, because after you learn this teaching, you will

reject everything, including me (the Guru)."

F. Example of Mayavadi logic:

1. Brahman "reflects" into Maya. Q: But how? If it reflects

(e.g. moon on water) it must have a form.

2. A. First understand that Brahman is not a substance, so rules

like that don't apply to it.

3. And apart from that, consider an object or substance that has

qualities. Form is one such quality. But does form have form?

4. Q. What are you saying, `Does form have form?'

5. A. When you see a shadow or reflection, what is being reflected

- form or substance?

6. Q. Well - the form.

7. So the form is not the substance. Form is what is reflected, but that

form is different from the substance.

G. Jayatirtha Muni gives this example of Mayavadi process: just as when a person has a bad dream, the dream wakes him up; similarly, though the Mayavadi philosophy is still "maya", it can wake one up out of illusion.

H. Two schools of Mayavadi philosophy.

1. One accepts only Upanisads, Vedanta and Bhagavad‑gita

(prasthan-traya).

2. But the so-called Bhagavat-sampradaya (with acaryas like

Citsukhacarya and Madhusudan Sarasvati) accept Puranas,

Ramayana, etc. Just as Mayavadis in general are more dangerous

than Buddhists, the Bhagavat‑sampradaya is most dangerous of all.

They even accept Krishna's form is spiritual, but say that when

He returns to the Paramvyoma, His form "dissolves" into Brahman.

First school would argue Krishna's form is material.

I. Bhag Tyag Lakshana:

1. Bhag (person).

2. Tyag (give up)

3. I.e. Now you have this designation; give it up.

a. On wall of Vaishnava temple, a Mayavadi wrote "So' ham"

(I am Him).

b. A devotee came later and added “Da”, "DaSo' ham" (I am His servant).

c. Mayavadi returned, added “Sa” for Sada So' ham (I am eter-

nally Him).

d. Devotee returned again and added “Da” for “Dasadaso’ham”

(I am the servant of His servant).

IV. Weaknesses of Mayavadi Philosophy.

A. Their "Brahman" and Vyasadeva's Brahman are not the same.

1. Their Brahman is the Brahmajyoti.

2. Vyasadeva's Brahman is Krishna, the Purushottama.

3. Because they have no interest in Krishna, their Brahman

categorically has no reality (it is wrongly defined from the outset).

a. Vyasa used the word Brahman as we use the word “God”.

b. It is a general term, used to create interest among as many

people as possible (even those who are averse to Krishna).

B. They speak of "Sarvikalpa jnana" and "Nirvikalpa jnana", but these are actually the same thing.

1. Example of approaching a mountain from a distance - at each stage,

the same entity is being viewed.

2. But Mayavadis say the far-off vision of a great shape on the horizon

is of a different thing than the close-up view of the mountain.

C. They interpret Sanskrit words inaccurately to fit their own ideas.

1. Lord is "asarira." They say this means He has no sarira or body;

but the root of the word sarira means "decay", so the word really

refers to a body that decays, not simply a body.

2. Lord is "akarana." They say this means He has no senses; but this

word really means that His senses are not energized by something

else (e.g. as our material senses are energized by life energy)

because He is directly His own form.

D. They interpret "He desired to become many" as meaning the progression

from Brahman-Iswara-Jiva; but it is the Iswara who has the desire to beco-

me many. How the desireless Brahman desired to become the Iswara they

do not explain.

E. If Brahman is all-pervading, where is Maya?

F. How is the Brahman cut into individual parcels of consciousness?

G. Mayavadis say, "By knowledge (jnana), one becomes Brahman."

1. But they also say that jnana and ajnana are Maya.

2. So you may remove your ajnana with jnana, but then with

what will you remove the jnana?

3. To this they answer, "It is by the mercy of Brahman." (!)

H. They say Brahman is without energy (shakti). Then how does it exist? (No answer).

I. Snake and Rope:

1. In order for this example to have validity, the person must have

prior knowledge of both "what is a rope" and "what is a snake."

How can undifferentiated Brahman have prior knowledge of Maya,

which it then mistakes itself to be?

2. Besides that, in this example, the rope and snake are both real

things, and that's why the illusion is effective. And since the

illusion is effective, it is also true, i.e. the consequences of that

illusion are no less effective than if the rope was really a snake

(I'm scared, I scream, run away, etc.).

J. They say Maya is like a dream, but there's no continuity in our dreams from one night to the next. In the waking state we find day-to-day continuity. So to compare this life to a mere dream is facile.

K. Why is this illusion so consistent, if it is just hallucination? Why doesn't illusion come us to in other ways, e.g. instead of Brahman is the world (rope is snake), why not the world is Brahman (snake is rope)?

H. Mayavadis say one can only achieve liberation after death. Then his indivi-

duality ceases forever.

1. But how does this relate to their favorite rope/snake analogy?

One man lights a lamp and sees that the snake is really just a rope;

another man runs off, frightened, never knowing it was an illusion.

How are these two men different in their essential existance?

I. Who suffers in hell - soul or body?

1. Mayavadi may answer, "the body suffers only."

2. But the body is matter, is it not?

3. Yes.

4. How can dead matter suffer?

5. Then it must be the soul that suffers.

6. Then you are saying Brahman suffers? But your philosophy

says there's no suffering in Brahman.

J. Shankara writes of the "vyavaharika" platform of exis tance, but nowhere is this word found in any scripture. Yet it is a fundamental component of his philosophy.

K. Upanishads say that nothing can attach itself to Brahman and it cannot be described in words. Shankara says these statements form the complete description of Brahman.

1. Sankara says take these descriptions literally.

2. How? By hearing these words, don't the Mayavadis become

attached to Brahman?

L. Katha Upanishad 3.11: Above the jagat is avyakta, above avyakta is

Purusha, and beyond Him is nothing else.

V. A look at Jiva Goswami's refutations of Mayavadi Philosophy:

A. He established the Srimad Bhagavatam as the shastric reference par

excellence.

1. Brhad Aranyaka Upanishad 2.41 - 4 Vedas, Itihasa and

Puranas have come from breath of Narayana.

2. Chandogya Upanishad 3.15.7 - 4 Vedas, Itihasas and

Puranas are 5th Veda.

a. 4 cows and 1 buffalo are never grouped as a herd of 5

cows, because a buffalo is not a cow.

b. 5 cows means 5 cows.

3. Mahabharata says "Puranas make Vedas complete."

4. Shankaracharya's guru's guru wrote a commentary on a book

that cited slokas from the Srimad Bhagavatam.

5. Garuda Purana says "artho 'yam brahma sutranam": Bhagavat

Purana gives meaning of Vedanta-sutra, Gayatri and the 4 Vedas.

6. Srimad Bhagavatam is the ripened fruit of the tree of the

Vedic scriptures.

7. Srimad Bhagavatam is Veda: "it is compiled by the Lord Himself."

8. Sukadeva Goswami was a Brahmajnani who became a devotee.

Vyasadeva compiled the Bhagavatam only for Sukadeva, because

only he could understand it (his other disciples were not qualified).

a. Sukadeva ran away as soon as he was born. Vyasa told his

other disciples to chant 3 verses from the Srimad Bhagavatam in order to attract him back to the ashram (they were to chant

these verses out loud when entering the forest to gather

firewood or fetch water).

b. Thus Sukadeva was attracted and returned to learn Srimad

Bhagavatam at the feet of his father. He cannot be attracted

by anything material. Therefore S.B. has something higher

than even Brahman realization (atmarama verse).

B. Srimad Bhagavatam establishes Krishna as the Param Brahman.

1. Hiranyakashipu used the "neti neti" process to negate any possible

chance of his being killed by an enemy when he requested a boon

from Lord Brahma.

a. He left no chance that any type of entity within the material

world could harm him.

b. Practically he left only the Brahman. And that Brahman came

as Narasingha and destroyed him; thus Lord Nrsinghadeva

is the Supreme Brahman.

2. Even Sridhara Swami has commented on "krishna’stu bhagavan

svayam ", "narayana eva." But Srila Jiva Goswami established

Lord Krishna as the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

3. In the wrestling arena, everyone saw Krishna differently. The

yogis saw Him as the Tattva Paramam (Supreme Truth).

4. The pastime of Lord Damodar shows how the Supreme is unlimited,

yet has a body.

5. Devaki said, "That Brahman, jyoti...etc. that all the impersonalists

(jnanis and yogis) are seeking is You."

VI. Vadiraja's Refutations of Key Tenets of Mayavadi Philosophy.

A. Vadiraja comes in the line of Madhvacharya. He lived in the 16th century. He is said to have lived for 120 years.

B. How Vadiraja exposed Mayavadi misinterpretations:

1. Vadiraja showed how Mayavadis have taken the "neti‑neti"

statement out of context.

a. They say "not this, not this" means "not jiva, not jada"

(Brahman is neither the individual soul, nor matter - therefore,

since only Brahman exists, jiva and jada must be unreal).

b. But they've derived "neti-neti" from Brhad-aranyaka

Upanishad 4.4.22, which states: "For the desire for sons

is the desire for wealth and the desire for wealth the

desire for worlds; both these are, indeed, desires only.

This Self is not this, not this."

c. This verse is stating that the Self (atman) is not to be had by

desiring wealth or worlds. The direct meaning is sufficient;

the "jada-jiva" interpretation is without foundation.

2. The meaning of "advaita":

a. Mayavadis take "advaita" (not dual) to mean that Brahman

has no difference. Therefore undifferentiated oneness is the

only truth.

b. But the context is found in Chandogya Upanishad

6.2.1&2 - "In the beginning, my dear, this was Being,

one only, without a second."

c. Vadiraja showed that "one without a second means,

according to grammar and logic, "one Being without a

second Being", or "He has no second", i.e. there is only

one God. But this does not mean that some thing or

things below God can't be distinguished from Him.

i. If the the word "advitiyam" as it appears in this

verse actually means that nothing except

undifferentiated Brahman exists, then the very text

from which the word comes would be unreal, as it

is a feature of the realm of difference.

ii.Thus the validity of the text would be destroyed by the

very philosophy the Mayavadis ascribe to it.

iii.He proved his point further with this example - if one

says "The lotus is blue", he does not mean to say that

"lotus" and "blue" are exact synonyms. He means that

blueness is a quality of the lotus. Similarly, when

shastra says"Brahman is everything","everything" and

"Brahman" are not exact synonyms, rather"everything"

(souls and matter) are qualities of Brahman.

Or, as blueness is a quality inseparable from the lotus,

so we are inseparable from Brahman (but as Brahman

has qualities we don't have, still there is distinction

in this inseparability).

3. Vadiraja points out that Mayavadis say that both practical life

and the scriptures are on the vyava harika platform - which

means both are ultimately unreal. Yet they honor the scriptures and

honor sattvik life as dispellers of illusion.

a. In practical life, what is "true" is what works, i.e. what

brings good results. What is "untrue" breeds bad results.

But a Mayavadi cannot distinguish between these two

categories of action. Thus even on their so- called

vyavaharika platform, they have no ultimate reference for

deciding what is auspicious and what is inauspicious.

b. For example, using a Mayavadi analogy, the Mayavadis

are not able to explain the difference between a man

who sees that there is no silver in a silvery shell and the

man who thinks that silver is there.

I. They will say the man who discovered his error is

conventionally correct (vyava harika), and the

man who did not is under pratibhasika illusion.

ii.But the main thing is, both are in ultimate illusion.

Now, the silvery shell analogy is used by them to

illustrate how one comes out of ULTIMATE illusion

and attains the truth (paramarthika). Yet, using their

own doctrine as the test, this example prooves

itself invalid. So what are we left with?

4. Vadiraja compares the Mayavadis with Paundraka. He asks,

"If Mayavadi philosophy is so pregnant with Truth, why did Krishna

and His associates in Dwaraka laugh derisively when they heard

Paundraka's letter, which simply made the same claims as the

Mayavadi philosophers? Why did Shukadeva Goswami, when

reciting this event to Maharaja Parikshit before the learned assembly

of great saints and sages, censure Paundraka repeatedly?

Why did Vyasa, who wrote this narration down, also not come to

the rescue of this doctrine?" Especially since the Mayavadis

would hold that Krishna, His court, Shukadeva, Parikshit,

the assembly of sages and Vyasa were actually all Mayavadis too.

5. How Mayavadis explain the perception of this world:

a. Brahman is the only reality.

b. When we see an object (e.g. a silvery shell), it is nothing other

than the Brahman-consciousness itself appearing in that way.

c. But Brahman appears like a shell because of upadhi

(designation) that is superimposed upon it.

d. Still, Pure Consciousness shines through the upadhi,

making the object perceivable to our minds and senses.

e. This phenomenon of appearance is happening because

Brahman is obscured by avidya.

f. Before avidya can be removed, a vritti (modification) of

the viewer's mind must destroy the avidya surrounding

the silvery shell when the senses make contact with it.

This vritti is compared to a canal through which pure

consciousness flows to envelop the object in right

understanding.

g. When that happens, Brahman is mirrored in the vritti

which then lights up the object, revealing its true identity

with Brahman. Note: in this philosophy, the senses do not

perceive the object. Nor even the mind. Nor the vritti,

for the vritti is but a key that unlocks the door behind which

is the floodlight of Brahman, which is the only consciousness.

. i. Who perceives the object? The Mayavadi

answers that the jiva (individual soul) does.

ii. But the jiva is verily Brahman, who thinks

himself an individual due to advidya

iii. By seeing the object in its true light, the jiva

knows its oneness with Brahman.

6. Vadiraja probes the Mayavadi explanation of perception: a. If in the example of the silvery shell, only the Brahman-

consciousness is perceiving, then how can the shell be

seen in two ways?

i. If the origin of the phenomenon "silvery shell" is

one and only one, why is it sometimes seen as a

shell, and sometimes as silver?

ii. The only "real" mechanism available to explain

this (since shell, avidya, jiva, senses, mind, and

even vritti are illusiory) is that Brahman is

"shining forth." For this, Shankara has quoted a

verse that appears in three Upanishads (Katha

2.2.15, Mundaka 2.2.15, Shvetashvatara 6.14):

"The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and

the stars, nor these lightenings, much less this

fire. After Him when He shines everything

shines; by the light of Him all this is lighted."

b. Still, there is no reason for the silver shell illusion in

the statement, "Brahman shines forth", nor in the quotes

given to support the statement.

c. Mayavadis say maya has two powers - veiling and projecting.

When it obscures Brahman, it exercises the first potency, and

when it projects an object (the shell) onto consciousness,

the second potency is exercised. But what about the illusion

of silver in the shell? That is not explained.

d. Vadiraja asks another question: Mayavadis say the object is a

"part" of Brahman, and that the perceiver of the object is

likewise a "part" of Brahman, each "part" arising out of the

avidya‑covering of the whole. So how does the one "part"

get transferred to the other (the object to the perceiving