THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY

THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY

A SIMPLE PSYCHOLOGICALLY ORIENTING DELIBERATION ON THE DOGMATIC ISSUE OF HEREDITARY SIN

by Soren Kierkegaard

Edited and Translated

with Introduction and Notes by

Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Oxford

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book

Editorial preparation of this work has been assisted by a grant Sore Lutheran Brotherhood, a ^aternal benefit society, with headquarters in Minneapolis, Minnesota

Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-^ee paper, and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines Jbr Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources

Printed in the United States of America 5 7 9 10 8 6

CONTENTS

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

The Concept of Anxiety

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

I Anxiety as the Presupposition of Hereditary Sin and as Explaining Hereditary Sin Retrogressively in Terms of Its Origin 25

vii

II Anxiety as Explaining Hereditary Sin Progressively 52

OBJECTIVE ANXIETY

SUBJECTIVE ANXIETY

A. The Consequence of the Relationship

of Generation B. The Consequence of the Historical Relationship

1. HISTORICAL INTIMATIONS REGARDING THE

CONCEPT OF HEREDITARY SIN 25

2. THE CONCEPT OF THE FIRST SIN 29

3. THE CONCEPT OF THE INNOCENCE 35

4. THE CONCEPT OF THE FALL 38

5. THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY 41

6. ANXIETY AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF HEREDITARY

SIN AND AS EXPLAINING HEREDITARY SIN

RETROGRESSIVELY IN TERMS OF ITS ORIGIN 46

Contents

III Anxiety as the Consequence of that Sin which Is Absence of the Consciousness of Sin 81

1. THE ANXIETY OF SPIRITLESSNESS

2. ANXIETY DEFINED DIALECTICALLY AS FATE

3. ANXIETY DEFINED DIALECTICALLY AS GUILT

IV Anxiety of Sin or Anxiety as the Consequence of Sin in the Single Individual 111

1. ANXIETY ABOUT EVIL

2. ANXIETY ABOUT THE GOOD (THE DEMONIC) I. Freedom Lost Somatically-Psychically II. Freedom Lost Pneumatically

V Anxiety as Saving through Faith

155

SUPPLEMENT

Key to References Original Title Page

Selected Entries from Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers Pertaining to The Concept of Anxiety

EDITORIAL APPENDIX

Acknowledgments

Collation of The Concept of Anxiety in the Danish Editions of Kierkegaard's Collected Works Notes

Bibliographical Note

'INDEX

103

113

118

136

137

163

164

166

169

215

217

219

221

257

259

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Among those attending W.F.J. Schelling's series of lectures on the philosophy of mythology and revelation (Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung) at the University of Berlin in the winter of 1841-1842 were both Friedrich Engels and Soren Kierkegaard.^ After the second lecture Kierkegaard wrote: "I am so happy to have heard Schelling's second lecture--indescribably. I have been pining and thinking mournful thoughts long enough. The embryonic child of thought leapt for joy within me, as in Elizabeth, when he mentioned the word 'actuality' in connection with the relation of philosophy to actuality."2 Although this initial enthusiasm declined rapidly, Kierkegaard continued to attend the lectures and took copious notes. What interested him in particular was Schelling's criticism of Hegel's rationalistic system, and upon his return to Copenhagen in 1842 he turned to the study of Leibniz, Descartes, and Aristotle, as well as to the anti-Hegelian writings of Adolph Trendelenburg3 and portions of W. G. Tennemann's history of philosophy? Each of these studies helped him to shape his own philosophical position and also furnished him with an arsenal for his relentless battle with Hegel and speculative idealism.

Leibniz's review of arguments pertaining to the problem of freedom interested Kierkegaard especially. In response to Leibniz's point in the Theodicy that the connection between

^ Paul Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," Journal of the History of Ideas, V

(1944), 44.

2 See p. 229, note 51.

3 Adolph Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen (Berlin: 1840; ASKB

842); Die logische Frage in Hegel's System. Zwei Streitschriften (Leipzig: 1843; ASKB 846). See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaards Forhold til Hegel (Copenhagen:

Gyldendal, 1967), pp. 241,269.

4 W. G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, I-XII (Leipzig: 1798-1819;

ASKB 815-26). See Thulstrup, Kierkegaards Forholdtil Hegel, pp. 241,243, 245-46,249-50.

viii Historical Introduction

judgment and will is not as necessary as one might think, Kierkegaard asked: "In what relationship does the will stand to the last act of the understanding. ú ú ?,,s He agreed with Leibniz that a completely indifferent will (a^quilibrium) is an absurdity and a chimera.6 In another journal entry he noted that Leibniz mentions two diff'^culties that have disturbed man: the relation between freedom and necessity, and the continuity of matter and its separate parts. The first problem has engaged all men; the second, only the philosophers. 7 Subsequently, Kierkegaard dealt with the problem of freedom in three of his pseudonymous works: Philosophical Fragments defines the ontological ground of freedom ;,nd its realm, whereas The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death consider the anthropological aspects of freedom.

In response to Descartes's idea of freedom, Kierkegaard noted in his papers that: "In freedom I can emerge only from that into which I have entered in freedom .... Ifl am going to emerge from doubt in freedom, I must enter into doubt in freedom. (Act of Will.)"s Therefore, Descartes, according to Kierkegaard, had inverted the relationship between thought and will:

Incidentally, it is noteworthy that Descartes, who himself in one of the meditations explains the possibility of error by recalling that freedom in man is superior to thought, nevertheless has construed thought, not freedom, as the absolute. Obviously this is the position of the elder Fichte--not cogito ergo sum, but I act ergo sum, for this cogito is something derived or it is identical with "I act"; either the consciousness of freedom is in the action, and then it should not read cogito ergo sum, or it is the subsequent consciousness.9

sjp II 1241(Pap. Iv C 39).

6Jp II 1241 (Pap. Iv c 39); Leibniz, Theodicy, ^311ff., 319; God. Guil.

Leibnitii Opera philosophica .... ed. J. E. Erdmann (Berlin: 1840; ASKB 620), pp. 595-98. See alsoJP III 2361, 3340; IV 4419; V 5581-85 (Pap. IV A 12, 14-18, 22, 35).

UP III 2360 (Pap. IV A 11). 8jp 1 777 (Pap. IV B 13:21).

9jp II 2338 (Pap. IV C 11).

Historical Introduction ix

In a marginal notation Kierkegaard added: "This transition is manifestly a pathosfilled transition, not dialectical, for dialectically nothing can be derived. To me this is important. A pathos-filled transition can be achieved by every man if he wills it, because the transition to the infinite, which consists in pathos, takes only courage.-^0

Kierkegaard criticized the Cartesian principle of methodical doubt because it mistakenly gives more weight to reflection (thought) than it does to act (will).

What skeptics should really be caught in is the ethical. Since Descartes they have all thought that during the period in which they doubted they dared not to express anything definite with regard to knowledge, but on the other hand they dared to act, because in this respect they could be satisfied with probability. What an enormous contradiction! As if it were not far more dreadful to do something about which one is doubtful (thereby incurring responsibility) than to make a statement. Or was it because the ethical is in itself certain? But then there was something which doubt could not reach!H

Descartes's apparently epistemological problem is for Kierkegaard an existential one; that is, the solution of doubt lies not in reflection but in resolution. ^

The remainder of Kierkegaard's studie^ during the fall of 1842 centered on Trendelenburg and Tennemann, and from them Kierkegaard gained insights into Aristotle's thought. References in his papers indicate that he also made use of primary sources. In a discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of motion, Tennemann wrote: "Because possibility and actuality are distinguishable in all things, change, insofar as it is change, is the actualization of the possible .... The transition from possibility to actuality is a change, ^civ^t^. This could be expressed more precisely by saying: change, motion, is the

^ojp III 2339 (Pap. Iv C 12). aUP 1 774 (Pap. Iv A 72).

^JP 1 776 (Pap. Iv B 5:13).

Historical Introduction

actualization of the possible as far as it is possible. ,,^3 This conception of change held great significance for Kierkegaard, and he made Tennemann's interpretation of ^civvlotq the point of departure for his own theory oftransitionlwhat in The Concept of Anxiety is referred to as the "qualitative leap."

Kierkegaard found support for his conception of the qualitative leap in Trendelenburg's idea that the highest principles can be demonstrated only indirectly (negatively). Yet he reproached Trendelenburg for his failure to recognize the necessity of a qualitative leap in order to recognize the validity of such principles.^4

Kierkegaard's primary criticism of Aristotle centers on his view that the real self resides ultimately in the thinking part of man, and that consequently the contemplative life constitutes man's highest happiness. Kierkegaard found in Aristotle an understanding that ethics will not admit of the precision required for scientific knowledge: "The definition of science that Aristotle gives in 6,3 is very important. The objects of science are things that can be only in a single way. What is scientifically knowable is therefore the necessary, the eternal, for everything that is absolutely necessary is also absolutely everlasting. ,,^s He does then agree with Aristotle that, strictly speaking, there is no scientific knowledge of human existence, since its essential qualification is one of freedom and not of necessity. However, from Kierkegaard's point of view, "Aristotle has not understood this self deeply enough, for only in the esthetic sense does contemplative thought have an entelechy, and the felicity of the gods does not reside in contemplation but in eternal communication.''^6 For Kierkegaard, therefore, Aristotle falls short in his understanding that the consummation of man's ethical life lies in the contemplative posture.

^3 Tennemann, Geschichte derPhilosophie, III, pp. 126-27. For Kierkegaard's

use of ^civ^!ot^ see Philosophical Fragments, KH/VII (SV IV 236-39). ^4Jp III 2341 (Pap. V A 74).

^sjp II 2281 (Pap. IV C 23). The reference is to Nicomachean Ethics, 1115

b, 18ff.

^6jp IV 3892 (Pap. IV C 26).

Historical Introduction xi

Following his studies of Leibniz, Descartes, and Aristotle, Kierkegaard began to delve deeper into the study of Hegel, centering on the Phenomenology of Mind and the Encylopvedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Where Hegel and his followers proclaimed the harmonious relationship of philosophical idealism and Christianity, Kierkegaard argued that Christianity and philosophy (Hegel's speculative idealism) present an irreconcilable opposition.^7 Thus, however else Kierkegaard may be classified in the history of thought, he stands in direct opposition to the philosophical idealism of his day.

There is no question but that Kierkegaard's thought was influenced by Hegel's; however, there is some disagreement as to the degree and nature of that influence. Per Lonning writes:

It has usually been maintained that Hegel's philosophy was a decisive influence in the formulation of Kierkegaard's thought, especially his conception of history and of the paradox in relation to history .... Such a view seems to be rooted in a complete failure to recognize fully how Kierkegaard's interpretation stands entirely independent of the Hegelian philosophy of religion. However, many of Kierkegaard's conceptual formulations may be due to a relation to Hegel.^s

The views of Stephen Crites and Mark Taylor would have Kierkegaard .considerably more indebted to Hegel, and as evidence they indicate the similarities between Kierkegaard's concept of the self in The Sickness unto Death and a passage in Hegel's Phenotnenology of Mind.^9 However, Niels Thulstrup

^7jp Ill 3245 (Pap. I A 94), October 17, 1835.

^8 Per Lonning, "Samtidighedens Situation" (Oslo: Forlaget Land og Kirke,

1954), p. 285.

^9 Stepben Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on

Faith and History (Chambersburg, Pa.: American Academy of Religion, 1972), p. 70; Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 104. See

The Sickness unto Death, KW XIX (SV XI 127-28); G.W.F. Hegel, Ph;inomenologie des Geistes, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke, vo!Istiindige

Ausgabe, I-XVIII, ed. Ph. Marheineke et al. (Berlin: 1832^, ASKB 549-65),

xii Historical Introduction

warns against being misled by verbal or terminological correspondences between Kierkegaard and Hegel, particularly with reference to Kierkegaard's triadic conception of selfhood in The Concept of Anxiety and other works.2ø

The Concept of Anxiety was published on June 17, 1844, the year in which Nietzsche was born and Kierkegaard was thirty-one years old. On the same day, Kierkegaard also published a book called Prefaces, and four days earlier Philosophical Fragments had appeared. In addition to these works, he published in the same year Two Upbuilding Discourses, Three Upbuilding Discourses, and Four Upbuilding Discourses.

According to Jens Himmelstrup,2^ Philosophical Fragments, Prefaces, and Four Upbuilding Discourses received contemporary reviews; the last work was honored with a review by Bishop J. P. Mynster, the primate of the Danish Church. However, there were no reviews of The Concept of Anxiety; in other words, this book, one of the most significant and possibly the most difficult of Kierkegaard's works, apparently caused no stir among scholars of the day.

The Concept of Anxiety has deep roots in the personal history of its author. That Kierkegaard lived intimately with anxiety is reflected in the numerous references' to this idea in his journals and works both before and after he wrote The Concept of Anxiety. In a journal entry for 1837, he speaks of certain presentiments that seem to precede everything that will happen and of an anxious consciousness by which "innocent but fragile souls can easily be tempted to believe themselves guilty.''^2 However, to Kierkegaard anxiety is clearly more pervasive and basic than simple presentiment.23 On

II, pp. 14-18; Si^'mtliche Werke,Jubili^'umsausgabe [J.A. ], I-XXVI, ed. Hermann

Glockner (Stuttgart: Fr. Fromans Verlag, 1927--40), II, pp. 23-26; The Phe-

nomenology of Mind, tr. J. P. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1%7), pp.

80--84.

20 Thulstrup, Kierleegaards Forhold til Hegel, p. 305. For the relation of Kier-

kegaard to Hegel and idealism, see the numerous references in the editorial

Notes to The Concept of Anxiety.

2^ S^ren Kierkegaard International Bibliografi (Copenhagen: Gyldendals For-

lag, 1%2), p. 10.

22 See Supplement, p. 169 (Pap. II A 18). 23 See pp. 42-43.

Historical Introduction xiii

May 12, 1839, he wrote, "All existence [Tilvcerelsen], from the smallest fly to the mysteries of the Incarnation, makes me anxious. ,,24 Three years after the publication of The Concept of Anxiety, he observed: "Deep within every human being there still lives the anxiety over the possibility of being alone in the world, forgotten by God, overlooked by the millions and millions in this enormous household.''2s Again, in an 1848 entry he reflected upon his own upbringing and the anxiety with which his father had filled his soul, upon his frightful melancholy, and upon his anxiety over Christianity, to which he was nevertheless drawn.^6 Finally, in 1850 he spoke of a "melancholy anxiety" and an "inborn anxiety. ,,27 The idea of anxiety and its relation to his own life was therefore a lifelong and pervasive concern.

The first published indication of Kierkegaard's deep interest in anxiety appears in his treatment of Mozart's Don Giovanni in Either/Or, where the concept is explored in its relation to sensuousness. Don Giovanni's anxiety, Kierkegaard suggests, is a substantial or prototypical kind,28 whereas that of Antigone is tragic? and Nero's anxiety is psychopathic.3ø However, it is in The Concept of Anxiety that/c^_erkegaard deals for the first time with "anxiety over nothing"--that pregnant anxiety that is directed toward the future and that is a pristine element in every human being.3^

The psychological concern that fostered The Concept of Anxiety figures in many of Kierkegaard's other works. Repetition is "A Venture in Experimenting3^ Psychology"; the subtitle of" 'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty?'" in Stages on Life's Way is

24 See Supplement, p. 170 (Pap. II A 420).

2s See Supplement, p. 171 (Pap. VIII^ A 363).

26 See Supplement, pp. 170-72 (Pap. IV A 107; IIIA 164; IX A 411).

27 See Supplement, pp. 172-73 (Pap. X2 A 493).

28 EitherlOt, I, KW III (S V I 107-08).

29 Either/Or, I, KI/V Ill (SV I 131-32).

3o Either/Or, II, KW IV (SV II 168-69).

3a For the numerous references to anxiety in Kierkegaard's works, see

S^ren Kierkegaard-Register, Sag- og FoOcatterregister, by A. Ibsen, Tenninologisk Register, by I. Himmelstrup (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nor-

disk Forlag, 1936).

32 Danish: experirnenterende. On this word in its various forms, see Fear and

xiv Historical Introduction

"An Imaginary Psychological Construction"; the subtitle of The Sickness unto Death is "A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening"; and The Concept of Anxiety has as its subtitle, "A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin." These subtitles reflect the history of Kierkegaard's personal experience and the extent to which these works represent an analysis of his own self.

His contribution to psychological thought did not go unnoticed. In 1881 Georg Brandes,33 a celebrated writer and literary critic, wrote in a letter to Nietzsche, "In my opinion, he [Kierkegaard] is one of the most profound psychologists who ever lived."

Historically, the psychology with which Kierkegaard worked is quite different from present-day psychological research. His is a phenomenology that is based on an ontological view of man, the fundamental presupposition of which is the transcendent reality of the individual, whose intuitively discernible character reveals the existence of an eternal component. Such a psychology does not blend well with any purely empirical science and is best understood by regarding soma, psyche, and spirit as the principal determinants of the human structure, with the first two belonging to the temporal realm and the third to the eternal.

From the positivistic point of view, the psychology of The Concept of Anxiety was attacked by the philosopher Harald HOffding,34 whose criticism was directed especially against the idea of the "qualitative leap." He maintained that the sciences, including the science of psychology, are based on the assumption that there is an unbroken continuity in the passage from possibility to actuality and that every new state is

Trembling and Repetition, KW VI, Historical Introduction, notes 30-55 and related texts; note on subtitle.

33 Correspondence de Georg Brandes, I-VI, ed. Paul KrUger (Copenhagen:

Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1966), Ill, p. 448 (ed. tr.).

34 Saren Kierleegaard sore Filosof (Copenhagen: Gyldendalsk Boghandels

Forlag, 1877; 2 ed., 1919), pp. 70-82.

Historical Introduction xv

thereby the simple consequence of a previous state. For Hoffding, a presuppositionless leap would abrogate the strict continuity required in every science. Yet this is precisely Kierkegaard's point, namely, that the "qualitative leap" is a category outside the scope of scientific procedures and that its confirmation is therefore not reducible to the principles of verification assumed by the sciences. Kierkegaard expressed this difference by positing not only psychosomatic dimensions in human existence but also a dimension of spirit, distinguishing the "outwardness" of scientific observation from the "inwardness" of spiritual experience. A psychology that does not account for the determining and transforming activity of spirit in the self-conscious subject will not accurately reflect what grounds and generates the quality of man's becoming. The Concept of Anxiety then suggests that the psychologist could analyze this notion and its relation to the "qualitative leap" produced in the dialectic of freedom in order to work toward a more adequate grasp of man's nature and the ontological determinants that shape the human condition.

In recent years The Concept of Anxiety has been recognized by philosphers, theologians, and psychologists as one of Kierkegaard's major works. Kierkegaard's method is keyed to the principle unum noris omnes,3s which actually expresses the same as the Socratic "know yourself," provided that unum is understood to be the observer himself, who does not look for an omnes but determinedly holds fast to himself, the one who actually is all. Thus every human being possesses, or is within himself, a complete expression of humanness, whose essential meaning cannot be gained from scientific studies. That is, neither rational speculation nor natural science will disclose to the existing individual his essential nature and purpose. Self-knowledge is attained by man in existing; that is, self-knowledge is coordinate with the actualizing of one's potentiality to become oneself.36

3s See p. 79.

36 See Concluding Unscientific Postscript, KW XII (S V VII 3074)9).

xvi Historical Introduction

Kierkegaard's principle of unum noris omnes has created interest among thinkers who draw heavily upon existential psychology. Martin Heidegger "denies that it is possible to approach Being through objective reality, and insists that 'Existential Being,' Dasein, self-relatedness, is the only door to Being itself. The objective world (Das Vorhandene) is a late product of immediate personal experience.''37 According to Karl Jaspers, personal existence ("Existential Subjectivity") is the center and aim of reality. No being who lacks such personal experience "can ever understand existence.''3s In this connection, it is only proper to state that Kieficegaard's principle ofunum noris omnes refers to self-knowledge. The task of the subjective thinker is to understand himself in his existence. "Know yourself" is to be understood in the Greek way as the Greeks would have understood it if they had possessed Christian presuppositions. 39

Paul Tillich's view of anxiety somewhat parallels that of Kierkegaard. He defines anxiety as "finitude in awareness": "Anxiety is the self-awareness of the finite self as finite." Like finitude, anxiety is ontological; it cannot be derived from anything. Anxiety differs from fear in that the object of anxiety is "nothingness," and nothingness is not an "object." Fear relates itself to objects--for example, a danger, a pain, an enemy--for it is psychological and can be conquered. Anxiety cannot be conquered, for no finite being can conquer its finitude. Anxiety is always present, although it may be latent. Because it is ontological, anxiety expresses finitude from the inside. Tillich also speaks of "the anxiety of losing our ontological structure," which is "the anxiety of not being what we essentially are. It is anxiety about disintegrating and falling into non-being through existential disruption," with "the consequent destruction of the ontological structure." In a very significant footnote, Tillich says: "Psychotherapy cannot remove ontological anxiety, because it cannot change the structure of finitude. But it can remove compulsory forms of

Quoted by Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," p. 57. Ibid. 39 See p. 79.

Historical Introduction xvii

anxiety and can reduce the frequency and intensity of fears. It can put anxiety 'in its proper place.' ,,40

Kierkegaard's concepts of the self and of anxiety are basic to Reinhold Niebuhr's doctrine of man. Man stands at the juncture of nature and spirit; he is involved both in freedom and necessity; he is both limited and limitless. "Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of freedom and finiteness in which man is involved .... It is the inevitable spiritual state of man, standing in the paradoxical situation of freedom and finiteness. ,,4^ Anxiety is the permanent internal preconditioning of sin as well as of creativity.

Similarly, Rollo May emphasizes that anxiety is not an affect among other affects, such as pleasure and sadness. It is an ontological characteristic of man, rooted in his very existence. Fear is a threat to the periphery of one's existence and can be studied as an affect among other affects. Anxiety is a threat to the foundation and center of one's existence. It is ontological and can be understood only as a threat to Dasein. If the individual did not have some measure of freedom, there could be no experience of anxiety. 42

Kierkegaard emphatically affirms the religious dimension of the self: "The formula that describes the state of the self when despair is completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests [or, has its ground] transparently in the power that established it. ,,43 For Kierkegaard this power is God.44 The God-relation is an ontological quality of the self, apart from which the self cannot fully actualize itself or know itself as the infinite. self.

Although Kierkegaard's ontological structure of the self has influenced philosophers like Heidegger and Sartre and psychologists of the existential-analytical school, these thinkers

40 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I-III (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1959-64), I, pp. 191-92, 199.

4a Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I-II (New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), I, p. 182.

42 Rollo May et al., Existence (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1958), pp.

50-51.

43 The Sickness unto Death, KW XIX (S V XI 128). 44 Pap. VIII2 B 170:2.

xviii Historical Introduction

do not accept the God-relation of the self. Thus Ludwig Binswanger acknowledges his indebtedness to Kierkegaard and draws upon aspects of his thought, but he rejects the God concept, which in Kierkegaard's structure of the self is the ultimate. 4s

Kierkegaard's style is different from that of contemporary writers, and readers may think this translation both stilted and long-winded. The Concept of Anxiety does not read like a popular book on psychological problems. There is an inordinate number of categorical terms and substantive phrases, and clause upon clause in sentence upon sentence leaves the reader breathless. However, to break up some of Kierkegaard's longer sentences would probably obscure rather than clarify his meaning.

Although every translation leaves something to be desired by comparison with the original, in this one every effort has been made to emulate what was done in a studied and deliberate manner by the author of The Concept of Anxiety. The work, by the pseudonymous Vigilius Haufniensis, is original and seminal and therefore demands new and arresting classifications. His expression is the result of an exacting analysis of concepts, which he carries on without apology in the need to drive home vital distinctions. Moreover, if the style used for this purpose is relentless and often overwhelming, from Kierkegaard's point of view this mood is essential. Although the tone is more direct and didactic than in his other pseudonymous works, the magnitude of the reflection surrounding the concept of anxiety requires the reader to examine every pertinent implication in order to arrive at an increasingly profound and multidimensioned awareness of what anxiety is. Such is the kind of reflection that provides the approach to self-knowledge, and such, therefore, is the character of Kierkegaard's dialectic.

4s Ludwig Binswanger, "Insanity as Life-Historical Phenomenon and as Mental Disease: The Case of Ellen Ilse," and "The Case of Ellen West, an Anthropological-Clinical Study ," in May et al., Existence, pp. 236,297-98.

THE CONCEPT OFANXIETY

A SIMPLE PSYCHOLOGICALLY ORIENTING DELIBERATION ON THE DOGMATIC ISSUE

OF HEREDITARY SIN

by Vigilius Haufniensis

The age of making distinctions is past. It has been vanquished by the system. In our day, whoever loves to make distinctions is regarded as an eccentric whose soul clings to something that has long since vanished. Be that as it may, yet Socrates still is what he was, the simple wise man, because of the peculiar distinction that he expressed both in words and in life, something that the eccentric Hamann first reiterated with great admiration two thousand years later: "For Socrates was great in 'that he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not understand.'"

TO THE LATE

PROFESSOR POUL MARTIN M^LLER

THE HAPPY LOVER OF GREEK CULTURE, THE ADMIRER OF HOMER, THE CONFIDANT OF SOCRATES, THE INTERPRETER OF ARISTOTLE--DENMARK 'S JOY IN ' 'JOY OVER DENMARK, ' ' THOUGH "WIDELY TRAVELED" ALWAYS "REMEMBERED IN THE DANISH SUMMER"--THE OBJECT OF MY

ADMIRATION, MY PROFOUND LOSS,

THIS WORK

IS DEDICATED.

PREFACE^

In my opinion, one who intends to write a book ought to consider carefully the subject about which he wishes to write. Nor would it be inappropriate for him to acquaint himself as far as possible with what has already been written on the subject. If on his way he should meet an individual who has dealt exhaustively and satisfactorily with one or another aspect of that subject, he would do well to ^ejoice as does the bridegroom's friend who stands by and rejoices greatly as he hears the bridegroom's voice.2 When he has done this in complete silence and with the enthusiasm of a love that ever seeks solitude, nothing more is needed; then he will carefully write his book as spontaneously as a bird sings its song,3 and if someone derives benefit or joy from it, so much the better. Then he will publish the book, carefree and at ease and without any sense of self-importance, as if he had brought everything to a conclusion or as if all the generations of the earth were to be blessed4 by his book. Each generation has its own task and need not trouble itself unduly by being everything to previous and succeeding generations. Just as each day's trouble is sufficient for the day,s so each individual in a generation has enough to do in taking care of himself and does not need to embrace the whole contemporary age with his paternal solicitude or assume that era and epoch6 begin with his book, and still less with the New Year's torch7 of his promise or with the intimations of his farseeing promises or with the referral of his reassurance to a currency of doubtful value. s Not everyone who is stoop-shouldered is an Atlas, nor did he become such by supporting a world. Not everyone who says Lord, Lord, shall enter the kingdom of heaven.9 Not everyone who offers himself as surety for the whole contemporary age proves by such action that he is reliable and can vouch for himself. Not everyone who shouts Bravo, schwere Noth, Gottsblitz, bravissimo ^0 has therefore understood himself and his admiration.

279

280

The Concept of Anxiety

Concerning my own humble person,n I frankly confess that as an author I am a king without a country and also, in fear and much trembling,^2 an author without any claims. If to a noble envy or jealous criticism it seems too much that I bear a Latin name, I shall gladly assume the name Christen Madsen. Nothing could please me more than to be regarded as a layman who indeed speculates but is still far removed from speculation, although I am as devout in my belief in authority as the Roman was tolerant in his worship of God. When it comes to human authority, I am a fetish worshipper and will worship anyone with equal piety, but with one proviso, that it be made sufficiently clear by a beating of drums that he is the one I must worship and that it is he who is the authority and Imprimatur^3 for the current year. The decision is beyond my understanding, whether it takes place by lottery or balloting, or whether the honor is passed around so that each individual has his turn as authority, like a representative of the burghers on the board of arbitration.

Beyond this I have nothing to add except to wish everyone who shares my view and also everyone who does not, everyone who reads the book and also everyone who has had enough in reading the Preface, a well meant farewell.

Copenhagen

Respectfully,

VIGILIUS HAUFNIENSIS

INTRODUCTION

The sense in which the subject of our deliberation is a task of psychological interest and the sense in which, after having been the task and interest of psychology, it points directly to dogmatics.

The view that every scientific issue within the larger compass of science has its definite place, its measure and its limit, and thereby precisely its harmonious blending in the whole as well as its legitimate participation in what is expressed by the whole, is not merely apiurn desiderium [pious wish] that ennobles the man of science by its enthusiastic and melancholy infatuation. This view is not merely a sacred duty that commits him to the service of the totality and bids him renounce lawlessness and the adventurous desire to lose sight of the mainland; it also serves the interest of every more specialized deliberation, for when the deliberation forgets where it properly belongs, as language often expresses with striking ambiguity, it forgets itself and becomes something else, and thereby acquires the dubious perfectibility of being able to become anything and everything. By failing to proceed in a scientific manner and by not taking care to see that the individual issues do not outrun one another, as if it were a matter of arriving first at the masquerade, a person occasionally achieves a brilliance and amazes others by giving the impression that he has already comprehended that which is still very remote. At times he makes a vague agreement with things that differ. The gain is always avenged, as is every unlawful acquisition, which cannot be owned legally or scientifically.

Thus when an author entitles the last section of the Logic "A c t u a 1 i t y, ' ,^4 he thereby gains the advantage of making it appear that in logic the highest has already been achieved, or if one prefers, the lowest. In the meantime, the loss is obvious, for neither logic nor actuality is served by placing actuality in

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the Logic. Actuality is not served thereby, for contingency, which is an essential part of the actual, cannot be admitted within the realm of logic. Logic is not served thereby, for if logic has thought actuality, it has included something that it cannot assimilate, it has appropriated at the beginning what it should only praedisponere [presuppose]. The penalty is obvious. Every deliberation about the nature of actuality is rendered difficult, and for a long time perhaps made impossible, since the word "actuality" must first have time to collect itself, time to forget the mistake.

Thus when in dogmatics faith is called the immediate^s without any further qualification, there is gained the advantage that everybody is convinced of the necessity of not stopping with faith. The admission may be elicited even from one who subscribes to orthodoxy, because at first he perhaps does not discern the misunderstanding, that it does not have its source in a subsequent error but in that ^p^ov ^s^oq [fundamental error]. The loss is quite obvious. Faith loses by being regarded as the immediate, since it has been deprived of what lawfully belongs to it, namely, its historical presupposition. Dogmatics loses thereby, because it does not begin where it properly should begin, namely, within the scope of an earlier beginning. Instead of presupposing an earlier beginning, it ignores this and begins without ceremony, just as if it were logic. Logic does indeed begin with something produced by the subtlest abstraction, namely, what is most elusive: the immediate. What is quite proper in logic, namely, that immediacy is eo ipso canceled, becomes in dogmatics idle talk. Could it ever occur to anyone to stop with the immediate (with no further qualification), since the immediate is annulled^6 at the very moment it is mentioned, just as a somnambulist wakes up at the very moment his name is mentioned? Thus when one sometimes fmds, and almost solely in propaedeutic investigation, the word "reconciliation"a7 [Forsoning] used to designate speculative knowledge, or to designate the identity of the perceiving subject and the object perceived, or to designate the subjective-objective, etc., it is obvious that the author is brilliant and that by means of this

Introduction 11

brilliance he has explained every riddle, especially to all those who even in matters of science use less care than they do in daily life, where they listen carefully to the words of the riddle before they attempt to guess its meaning. Otherwise he gains the incomparable reputation of having posed by virtue of his explanation a new riddle, namely, how it could ever occur to any man that this might be the explanation. The notion that thought on the whole has reality was assumed by all ancient and medieval philosophy. With Kant, this assumption became doubtful. If it is now assumed that Hegelian philosophy has actually grasped Kant's skepticism^s thoroughly (something that might continue to remain a great question despite all that Hegel and his school have done with the help of the slogan "method and manifestation''^9 to conceal what Schelling2ø with the slogan "intellectual intuition and construction" openly acknowledged as a new point of departure) and now has reconstructed the earlier in a higher form and in such a way that thought does not possess reality by virtue of a presupposition---does it therefore also follow that this reality, which is consciously brought forth by thought, is a reconciliation? In that case, philosophy has only been brought back to where the beginning was made in the old days, when reconciliation did in fact have enormous significance. There is an old, respectable philosophical terminology: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. A more recent terminology has been chosen in which "mediation" takes the third place. Is this such an extraordinary advance? "Mediation" is equivocal, for it suggests simultaneously the relation between the two and the result of the relation, that in which the two relate themselves to each other as well as the two that related themselves to each other. It indicates movement as well as repose. Whether this is a perfection must be determined by subjecting mediation to a more profound dialectical test, but, unfortunately, this is something for which we still must wait. One rejects synthesis and says "mediation." Very well. Brilliance, however, demands moresone says "reconciliation" [Forsoning], and what is the result? The propaedeutic investigations are not served by it, for naturally they gain as little in clarity as does the

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truth, as little as a man's soul gains in salvation by having a title conferred upon him. On the contrary, two sciences, ethics and dogmatics, become radically confused, especially when after the introduction of the term "reconciliation" it is further pointed out that logic and ^.6^,oq [the dogmatical] correspond to each other, and that logic is the proper doctrine of ^.6ToG.2^ Ethics and dogmatics struggle over reconciliation in a confinium [border area] fraught with fate. Repentance and guilt torment forth reconciliation ethically, while dogmatics, in its receptivity to the proffered reconciliation, has the historically concrete immediacy with which it begins its discourse in the great dialogue of science. And now what will be the result? Presumably language will celebrate a great sabbatical year in which speech and thought may be at rest so that we can begin at the beginning.

In logic, the negative22 is used as the impelling power to bring movement into all things. One must have movement in logic no matter how it is brought about, and no matter by what means. The negative lends a hand, and what the negative cannot accomplish, play on words and platitudes can,just as when the negative itself becomes a play on words.* In

* Exernpli gratia: We, sen ist was ist gewesen; ist gewesen is a ternpus pneten'tutn of

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seyn, ergo, Wesen is das aufgehobene Seyn, the Seyn that has been [For example:

Essence is what has been; "has been" is past tense of "to be," ergo, essence is annulled being, being that has been]. :a This is a logical movement! If anyone would take the trouble to collect and put together all the strange pixies and goblins who like busy clerks bring about movement in Hegelian logic (such as this is in itself and as it has been improved by the [Hegelian] school), a later age would perhaps be surprised to see that what are regarded as discarded witticisms once played an important role in logic, not as incidental explanations and ingenious remarks but as masters of movement, which made Hegel's logic something of a miracle and gave logical thought feet to move

on, without anyone's being able to observe them. Just as Lulu:4 comes run285

ning without anyone's being able to observe the mechanism of movement, so the long mantle of admiration conceals the machinery of logical movement. To have brought movement into logic is the merit of Hegel. In comparison with this, it is hardly worth mentioning the unforgettable merit that was Hegel's, namely, that in many ways he corrected the categorical definitions and their arrangement, a merit he disdained in order to run aimlessly.2s

Introduction 13

logic, no movement must come about, for logic is, and whatever is logical only is.* This impotence of the logical consists in the transition of logic into becoming, where existence [Tilvcerelse]26 and actuality come forth. So when logic becomes deeply absorbed in the concretion of the categories, that which was from the beginning is ever the same. Every movement, if for the moment one wishes to use this expression, is an immanent movement, which in a profound sense is no movement at all. One can easily convince oneself of this by considering that the concept of movement is itself a transcendence that has no place in logic. The negative, then, is immanent in the movement, is something vanishing, is that which is annulled. If everything comes about in this manner, nothing comes about at all, and the negative becomes an illusion. Nevertheless, precisely in order to make something come about in logic, the negative becomes something more; it becomes that which brings forth the opposition, not a negation but a contraposition. And thus the negative is not the stillness of the immanent movement; it is "the necessary other,''27 indeed, something that may be very necessary for logic in order to bring about movement, but it is something that the negative is not. Turning from logic to ethics, we find again the same indefatigable negative that is active in the entire Hegelian philosophy. Here one is astonished to discover that the negative is the evil.2s As a result, confusion is in full swing and there are no limits to cleverness, and what Mme

StaE1-Holstein29 has said of Schelling's philosophy, namely, that it makes a man clever for his whole life, applies in every way to Hegelianism. One can see how illogical the movements must be in logic, since the negative is the evil, and how unethical they must be in ethics, since the evil is the negative. In logic they are too much and in ethics too little. They fit nowhere if they are supposed to fit both. If ethics has no other transcendence, it is essentially logic. If logic is to have as

* The eternal expression for the logical is what the Eleatics through a misunderstanding transferred to existence: nothing comes into being [opkomtner], everything is.

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much transcendence as common propriety requires of ethics, it is no longer logic.

What has been developed here is probably too complicated in proportion to the space that it occupies (yet, considering the importance of the subject it deals with, it is far from too lengthy); however, it is in no way extraneous, because the details are selected in order to allude to the subject of the book. The examples are taken from a greater realm, but what happens in the greater can repeat itself in the lesser, and the misunderstanding is similar, even if there are less harmful consequences. He who presumes to' develop the system3ø is responsible for much, but he who writes a' monograph can and also ought to be faithful over a little. 3^

The present work has set as its task the psychological treatment of the concept of "anxiety," but in such a way that it constantly keeps in mente [in mind] and before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin. Accordingly, it must also, although tacitly so, deal with the concept of sin. Sin, however, is no subject for psychological concern, and only by submitting to the service of a misplaced brilliance could it be dealt with psychologically. Sin has its specific place, or more correctly, it has no place, and this is its specific nature. When sin is treated in a place other than its own, it is altered by being subjected to a nonessential refraction of reflection. The concept is altered, and thereby the mood that properly corresponds to the correct concept* is also disturbed, and instead of the endurance of the true mood there is the fleeting phantom of false moods. Thus when sin is brought into esthetics, the mood becomes either light-minded or melancholy, for the category in which sin lies is that of contradiction, and this is either comic or

iv * That science, just as much as poetry and art, presupposes a mood in the

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creator as well as in the observer, and that an error in the modulation is just as disturbing as an error in the development of thought, have been entirely forgotten in our time, when inwardness has been completely forgotten, and also the category of appropriation, because of the joy over all the glory men

thought they possessed or in their greed have given up as did the dog that Iv preferred the shadow.3a Yet every error gives birth to its own enemy. 0ut-

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side of itself, the error of thought has dialectics as its enemy, and outside of itself, the absence or falsification of mood has the comical as its enemy.

Introduction 15

tragic. The mood is therefore altered, because the mood that corresponds to sin is earnestness. The concept of sin is also altered, because, whether it become comic or tragic, it becomes in any case something that endures, or something nonessential that is annulled, whereas, according to its true concept, sin is to be overcome. In a deeper sense, the comic and the tragic have no enemy but only a bogeyman at which one either weeps or laughs.

If sin is dealt with in metaphysics, the mood becomes that of dialectical uniformity and disinterestedness, which ponder sin as something that cannot withstand the scrutiny of thought. The concept of sin is also altered, for sin is indeed to be overcome, yet not as something to which thought is unable to give life, but as that which is, and as such concerns every man.

If sin is dealt with in psychology, the mood becomes that of persistent observation, like the fearlessness of a secret agent, but not that of the victorious flight of earnestness out of sin. The concept becomes a different concept, for sin becomes a state. However, sin is not a state. Its idea is that its concept is continually annulled. As a state (de potentia [according to possibility ]), it is not, but de actu or in actu [according to actuality or in actuality] it is, again and again. The mood of psychology would be antipathetic curiosity, whereas the proper mood is earnestness expressed in courageous resistance. The mood of psychology is that of a discovering anxiety, and in its anxiety psychology portrays sin, while again and again it is in anxiety over the portrayal that it itself brings forth. When sin is dealt with in this manner, it becomes the stronger, because psychology relates itself to it in a feminine way. That this state has its truth is certain; that it occurs more or less in every human life before the ethical manifests itself is certain. But in being considered in this manner sin does not become what it is, but a more or a less.

Whenever the issue of sin is dealt with, one can observe by the very mood whether the concept is the correct one. For instance, whenever sin is spoken of as a disease, an abnormality, a poison, or a disharmony, the concept is falsified.

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Sin does not properly belong in any science,3a but it is the subject of the sermon, in which the single individual speaks as the single individual to the single individual. In our day, scientific self-importance has tricked pastors into becoming something like professorial clerks who also serve science and find it beneath their dignity to preach. Is it any wonder then that preaching has come to be regarded as a very lowly art? But to preach is really the most difficult of all arts and is essentially the art that Socrates praised, the art of being able to converse. It goes without saying that the need is not for someone in the congregation to provide an answer, or that it would be of help continually to introduce a respondent. What Socrates criticized in the Sophists, when he made the distinction that they indeed knew how to make speeches but not how to converse,34 was that they could talk at length about every subject but lacked the element of appropriation. Appropriation is precisely the secret of conversation.

Corresponding to the concept of sin is earnestness. Now ethics should be a science in which sin might be expected to find a place. But here there is a great difficulty. Ethics is still an ideal science, and not only in the sense that every science is ideal. Ethics proposes to bring ideality into actuality. On the other hand, it is not the nature of its movement to raise actuality up into ideality.* Ethics points to ideality as a task and assumes that every man possesses the requisite conditions. Thus ethics develops a contradiction, inasmuch as it makes clear both the difficulty and the impossibility. What is said of the law3s is also true of ethics: it is a disciplinarian that demands, and by its demands only judges but does not bring forth life. Only Greek ethics made an exception, and that was because it was not ethics in the proper sense but retained an esthetic factor. This appears clearly in its definition of virtue36 and in what Aristofie frequently, also in Ethica Nicomachea,

* If this is considered more carefully, there will be occasions enough to notice the brilliance of heading the last section of the Logic "Actuality," inasmuch as ethics never reaches it. The actuality with which logic ends means, therefore, no more in regard to actuality than the "being" with which it begins.

Introduction 17

states with amiable Greek naivet6, namely, that virtue alone does not make a man happy and content, but he must have health, friends, and earthly goods and be happy in his family. The more ideal ethics is, the better. It must not permit itself to be distracted by the babble that it is useless to require the impossible. For even to listen to such talk is unethical and is something for which ethics has neither time nor opportunity. Ethics will have nothing to do with bargaining; nor can one in this way reach actuality. To reach actuality, the whole movement must be reversed. This ideal characteristic of ethics is what tempts one to use first metaphysical, then esthetic, and then psychological categories in the treatment of it. But ethics, more than any other science, must resist such temptations. It is, therefore, impossible for anyone to write an ethics without having altogether different categories in reserve.

Sin, then, belongs to ethics only insofar as upon this concept it is shipwrecked with the aid of repentance.* If ethics is

* In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843),Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood--"Behold all things have become new"37 as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds. Either all of existence [Tilvaerelsen] comes to an end in the demand of ethics, or the condition is provided and the whole of life and of existence begins anew, not through an immanent continuity with the former existence, which is a contradiction, but through a transcendence. This transcendence separates repetition from the former existence [Tilvcerelse] by such a chasm that one can only figuratively say that the former and the latter relate themselves to each other as the totality of living creatures in the ocean relates itself to those in the air and to those upon the earth. Yet, according to the opinion of some natural scientists, the former as a prototype prefigures in its imperfection all that the latter reveals. With regard to this category, one may consult Repetition by Constantin Constantius (Copenhagen: 1843). This is no doubt a witty book, as the author also intended it to be. To my knowledge, he is indeed the first to have a lively understanding of "repetition" and to have allowed the preg-

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to include sin, its ideality comes to an end. The more ethics remains in its ideality, and never becomes so inhuman as to lose sight of actuality, but corresponds to actuality by presenting itself as the task for every man in such a way that it will mak